A number of theists simply refuse to play this type of inter-world-view plausibility game. Some claim that logical consistency is the only necessary criterion for the ration ality of theistic belief. Others grant that the plausibility of explanations for evil is, in principle, relevant to an evaluation of theistic belief, but argue that attempts to establish plausibility criteria which will be acceptable to both the theist and nontheist are fruitless (i.e. , are ulti mately question-begging). Still others claim that the very idea of a theist seriously seeking an explanation for evil is self-stultifying, as it demonstrates an absence of that basic trust in the moral integrity of God which is necessary to be a true theist. But there are also a number of theists who accept the evidential challenge, proposing what they consider to be plausible inter-world-view explanations for all, or some, seemingly unnecessary evil -e.g., the free will defence, the ultimate harmony defence, the 'soul-making' defence. Most recent evidential discussions debate whether such ex planations adequately justify all the evil which exists. At present, many philosophers would argue that they do not.
Recently, however, Robert Pargetter has outlined a novel theistic response to the evidential challenge.3 4 He argues that, even if the theist cannot produce plausible explana tions for the evil we experience, the atheologian has no justifiable basis for claiming that evil can in any sense count as strong evidence against God's existence. This contention is significant. If Pargetter is correct, the theist possesses a general argument which, in principle, allows him to successfully counter the evidential challenge. He need no longer depend on specific explanatory claims which may or may not be perceived as plausible by the nonthei s t.
My primary purpose is to demonstrate that Pargetter's argumentation is unsuccessful. But, in the process, I will also be identifying and clarifying the basic issues which I believe are relevant to any meaningful evidential discussion of evil. Pargetter, then, is not simply assessing (1c). He actu ally wishes to discuss the validity of (lc'): Assuming that no argument for God's existence is credible, our inability to resolve the prima facie conflict between the existence of evil and the existence of God is best explained by re jecting that God exists.
II
This fact is significant. Since (1c) cannot be affirmed without denying the existence of God, strictly speaking, it can only be affirmed by the true atheist. But both the ag nostic and the theist can also affirm (1c ' ) as to do so does not necessitate denying that God could or does exist. The theist or agnostic need only add that, when all other rele vant evidential data is considered, the 'negative' evidenceof which our inability to resolve the prima facie conflict between God and evil is a part -does not conclusively out weigh the 'positive' evidence with which it must compete. In short ( 1 c' ) is quite consistent with both theistic and agnos tic world-views. Of course, in and of itself, this fact in no way reflects upon the cogency of Pargetter's argument. But it does point out the controversial nature of his under taking. Let us see how well he fares.
Pargetter claims (as noted in 3a) that the nontheist begs the question when he presupposes the existence of a prima facie conflict between God and evil. This presupposition, we are told, "is what has to be justified." 8 The issue here is not whether evil is a reality or God is opposed to evil. The crucial issue is: Even granting that evil exists and God is opposed to it, is there a prima facie conflict between God and evil? Pargetter, p. 242-243 ^Pargetter, p. 244
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To respond, we obviously need to define 'prima facie moral conflict'. Normative definitions are notoriously problematic. But, with respect to the actions of individuals, it seems to me that our ordinary use of the terms in question allows us at least to maintain the following: A prima facie moral con flict arises when the actions of a person do not coincide with what we would normally expect of such an individual in a given context (i.e., do not coincide with our normal moral expecta tions for a person with his/her capacities and character in this or that situation). For example, let us suppose that a father, who we have been told is a loving individual, sits idly by while his daughter is mauled by a large dog. It would, I believe, be justifiable (and noncontroversial) to contend under such circumstances that the wide discrepancy between our normal moral expectations with respect to the actions of a loving person and what has actually occurred has generated a prima facie moral conflict between the two. Of course, we may discover that the father was 'frozen with fear1 or in a drug-induced stupor. If such were found to be the case, we would readily acknowledge that the prima facie conflict was not an actual (genuine) conflict, as such pieces of information would rightfully be seen as sufficient reasons why a loving father might not perform the type of action we expected of him. But, to generalize the point, when there exists a divergence between our normal moral expectations and the actual actions of a person, the possibility that the prima facie conflict is actual remains until we are able to explain why the person acted in such an unexpected manner.
Two clarifications are necessary. First, the distinction between establishing that a prima facie moral conflict may be actual and establishing that an actual moral conflict does in fact exist cannot be overemphasized. To establish that a prima facie moral conflict may be actuaire need only demonstrate that no plausible explanation for a given expectation/action discrepancy has yet been proposed. To establish that an actual moral conflict does in fact exist, we must know (be able to demonstrate conclusively) that no plausible explana tion of the requisite type could be proposed. The latter is obviously a much more difficult enterprise. Second, it should now be clear that the more we know about the character of the moral agent in question and the specific details of the actual situation under consideration, the less likely we will be to claim mistakenly that an actual moral conflict may (or does) exist. If, for example, we know that a certain individual 'freezes with fear' at the sight of dogs, we will rightfully not claim that an actual moral conflict is (or may be) generated by his failure to come to the aid of his daughter when a dog is involved. Our prior knowledge of his phobia would instantly furnish us with the necessary 'explanation'. In the present context, such a ploy is unhelpful. While all theists admit that terms predicated of God and man are not univocal, most theists realize that, if their utterances are to have any rational basis, such terms must have at least an analogical relationship. Moreover, all major forms of theism spell out quite clearly a number of aspects of 'goodness' which are common to both divine and secular usage. One of the most significant of these com mon semantical aspects is that upon which the above ana logy is based: to care for the physical and mental (spi ritual) well being of other persons (e.g., to protect those who are being threatened).
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What then of Pargetter's claim that the nontheist begs the question when he assumes the existence of a prima facie conflict between God and evil which is in need of explana tion? First, given the reading of 'prima facie moral conflict' just set forth, there seems no way he could deny that a prima facie conflict between God and evil exists. What he would still claim (or always desired to claim) it appears, is that the nontheist begs the question when he assumes that the prima facie conflict between God and evil may be actual (genuine). But we have seen that, if no plausible explanation for God's creative behavior can be articulated, it must be granted that the prima facie conflict between God and evil may be genuine. Since Pargetter grants in (1c ' ) that the discrepancy between our normal moral expectations and God's creative behavior is unresolved, (and even grants that the nontheists in ques tion do not possess compelling, independent reasons for be lieving in God's goodness) his claim that no prima facie con flict necessarily exists remains unjustified even under this more generous reading. This problem, alone, is not fatal to Pargetter's position. In his more significant criticism of (1c' ), he does not deny that there exists a prima facie conflict between God and evil which must be explained. He argues rather (as noted in 3b) that, even assuming the existence of such a moral con flict, the nontheist is not justified in claiming that our inability to resolve this prima facie conflict is best ex plained by rejecting that God exists. Two supporting argu ments are set forth. We are first told (as noted in 3bl) that "perhaps the suggestion that there is a solution which has not yet been found has been dismissed too quickly as a good explanation for the failure to resolve the apparent conflict. At least it is difficult to see why one can say that this is clearly a less plausible explanation than God's nonexistence. "10 Some clarifications are again required. First, we are no longer discussing explanations for God's seemingly unusual creative behavior. We are now discussing explanations for our inability to generate plausible explanations for such behavior. Second, as we have already seen, Pargetter assumes that the hypothetical nontheist with whom he is debating ack nowledges no good reason for believing in God's existence 10Pargetter, p. 244.
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(i.e., acknowledges no positive evidence against which that data counting against God's existence must be weighed). Accordingly, Pargetter1s real contention seems to be the following: (.3b 1 1 ) The nontheist who acknowledges no good reason for believing in God*s existence is not justified in claiming that our inability to generate plausible explana tions for the prima facie conflict between God and evil is best explained by rejecting the existence of God because it is no less plausible to assume that explanations for God's creative behavior exist but have simply not yet been discov ered .
To properly evaluate this contention, we must draw a dis tinction between 'plausibility'' and 'possibility' in the present context. Exact definitions for these terms are infamously elusive, but 'possibility' is basically a logical term. The existence of a state-of-affairs is normally said to be logically possible unless it can be conclusively dem onstrated that such could not be the case. 'Plausibility* tends to be more of an evidential term. The existence of a state-of-affairs is normally said to be plausible iff there exist good reasons to believe that such is the case. Given this distinction, Pargetter's 'plausibility com parison' can now be analyzed. As we have repeatedly seen, Pargetter grants for the sake of argument that no adequate (plausible) explanation for God's creative behavior has yet been articulated and assumes that the nontheists with whom he is debating acknowledge no compelling, independent data supporting God's goodness. But, if these conditions are imposed, the nontheist could have no justifiable basis for granting that the existence of adequate, but presently un known explanations for God's creative behavior is a plausible explanation for the unresolved prima facie conflict between God and evil. For the conditions which Pargetter himself imposes rule out the possibility that the nontheist could have any good reasons for affirming his explanatory option. The most the nontheist can be justifiably forced to admit under such conditions is that the existence of adequate, but unknown, explanations for God's creative behavior is a real possi bi1i ty.
On the other hand, the absence of a plausible explanation for God's behavior does raise legitimate doubts concerning God's character. Does this fact establish the plausibility of the nontheistic claim that the unresolved conflict between God and evil is best explained by rejecting the existence of God?
If the nontheist means that the unresolved conflict between God and evil is best explained by concluding that God could not, in fact, exist, the answer is no. The existence of a prima facie expectation/action discrepancy concerning God^s character is not, in and of itself, a sufficiently good reason to conclude that God could not, in fact, exist, But it is doubtful that the nontheist intends this strong of a reading when he claims that the unresolved conflict in question is best explained by rejecting God's existence. He more likely means that, in the absence of any plausible ex planation for God's creative behavior and any compelling, independent reason for believing that any such explanation exists, the doubts generated by this moral conflict force him presently to refrain from affirming the existence of God (i.e., force him to assume anagnostic stance). This is clearly a plausible position. As long as there exists a prima facie conflict between our normal moral expectations and the actual behavior of God, there exists the real possi bility that the conflict is actual (i.e., that there is no plausible explanation for God's behavior). And as long as there exists the real possibility that the conflict may be actual (and we have no compelling, independent reasons for believing that the necessary explanations exist), the exis tence of the resultant prima facie conflict does furnish a sufficiently good reason not to affirm at present the exis tence of the type of all powerful, wholly good God the or thodox theist postulates. Accordingly, (3bl') is clearly false. Since the nontheistic hypothesis is plausible and Pargetter's theistic option only possible, the nontheist is justified in contending that his stance is the most adequate.
Pargetter's other supporting argument for (3b) reads as follows: (3b2) "...there is a least one alternative ex planation often overlooked: the best possible world is a world where evil exists and where we do not (cannot) know the reason for evil (at least at this stage). It seems imposs ible to argue that this is a less plausible explanation than God's nonexistence without having either begged-the-question, or carried out some sort of direct assessment."P argetter, p. 244.
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This content ton (_3b2) suffers from the same basic problems as C3bl' ) _ , In the absence of any plausible explanation for God's creative behavior or any compelling, independent sup porting evidence for God's goodness, the thetsttc explanation for the unresolved conflict in question could not be affirmed as plausible by the nonthetst, The nontheist could only admit that Pargetter's theistic explanation describes a logically possi ble state-of-affairs.
But the nontheistic claim implicit in (3b2) can be ren dered plausible. If the nontheist means that since legiti mate doubts concerning God's goodness are raised by the un resolved prima facie conflict between God and evil, there exists a good reason for him to presently refrain from af firming the existence of God, his argument is sound. This reading, accordingly, falsifies Pargetter's claim that his theistic option -which is only logically possible -is equally adequate.
What then are we to say concerning Pargetter's concluding assertion: "To sum up, the claim that the existence of evil is strong evidence against the existence of God has not been justified,"'2 On the basis of our discussion of (3a) and (3b), two comments are necessary, Pargetter has shown that even the presence of unexplained evil, in and of itself, cannot justify the contention that God could not, in fact, exist. What Pargetter has failed to establish is that, in the face of no counter-evidence, the presence of unresolved evil in a world created by a wholly good God would not count strongly against the affirmation of God's existence (i.e., that unexplained evil should not strongly support an agnos tic stance).
Ill
A few concluding remarks are necessary. In the course of our discussion, we have touched on the three basic 'evi dential ' questions : fl) Does the existence of evil generate a prima facie conflict for the theist?
(2) If so, do there exist any plausible explanations for God's creative behavior?
(3) If not, how is this inability to resolve the prima facie conflict best explained?
The uniqueness of Pargetter's approach was his attempt to counter the 'evidential1 ' problem of evil without making reference to any specific explanations for God's creative behavior. Unfortunately, since (1) must be answered affirm atively, and the most plausible response to (.3) under the conditions Pargetter has imposed is an agnostic stance, his discussion offers little help to the theist who desires an effective counter to the evidential challenge which the pre sence of evil in a world supposedly created by a wholly good God generates.
The significance of this fact, however, must not be over estimated. The theist can still concern himself with (2), arguing that plausible explanations for God's creative be havior do, in fact, exist. This issue has certainly not yet been settled. Furthermore, our criticism of Pargetter has only demonstrated that, if it is assumed that no other evi dential factors are relevant, the most plausible response to (3) is an agnostic stance. But the theist need not (indeed, should not) discuss evil in isolation. It is part of our total experience which must be explained. Accordingly, even if discussing (3), the theist can argue that, when all evi dential factors are considered, a tentative commitment to theism is the most plausible option. This issue is also far from settled and nothing said in this paper should be con strued as an argument against such a theistic response to it.
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